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ABSTRACT
Practica] risk management for present and future
spacecraft, including space stations, involves the
optimization of residua] risks ba]anced by the space-
craft operational, technological, and economic ]imita-
tions. Spacecraft fire safety is approached through
three strategies, in order of risk: (l) control of
fire-causing elements, through exclusion of flammable
materials for example, (2) response to incipient fires
through detection and alarm, and (3) recovery of nor-
mal conditions through extinguishment and cleanup.
Present understanding of combustion in low gravity is
that, compared to normal-gravity behavior, fire haz-
ards may be reduced by the absence of buoyant gas
flows yet at the same time increased by ventilation
flows and hot particle expulsion. This paper dis-
cusses the application of low-gravity combustion
knowledge and appropriate aircraft analogies to fire
detection, fire fighting and fire-safety decisions
for eventual fire-risk management and optimization in
the spacecraft.
INTROOUCTION
Fire is one of the most feared hazards in space-
craft, just as it is in aircraft and boats. Not only
does fire threaten the occupants with the obvious
dangers of heat, toxic gases, and structural failure,
but it also can affect the crew and the mission integ-
rity and effectiveness in subt]e ways. Extinguishment
as well as combustion by-products can contaminate the
spacecraft breathing atmosphere. False alarms from
sensitive sensors, strict limitations on acceptable
materials, and stringent high-safety-factor operating
procedures all can restrain useful activities in space
missions.
Risk management encompasses the identification,
elimination, and control of hazards. In space mis-
sions, just as in other human endeavors, total elimi-
nation of hazards is impossible. Thus, fire-safety
strategies aim to optimize risk levels by reducing
hazards to a minimum while recognizing the opera-
tional, technological, and economic restraints on
spacecraft fire safety (Peercy and Raasch, 1986,
Rodney, 1987).
Present spacecraft fire-safety procedures are
adequate, to the extent of the limited knowledge of
fire behavior in the milieu of space. Extended mis-
sion schedules and unique features of future space-
craft concepts, however, will make more demands on
fire safety. The primary emphasis of the paper is on
the U.S. Space Station Freedom, which is a permanent
orbiting habitat, laboratory, and workshop that is
expected to operate within a decade. Freedom incorpo-
rates varied and complex structures, carries a crew of
differing skills, accommodates scientific, manufactur-
ing, and housekeeping activities, and serves as a
self-contained community with rescue many days away
(DeMeis, 1986).
Peercy et al. (1985a) undertook a study of risk
management and safety trade-offs for the baseline
designs of a U.S. space station. Many potential
threats to crew safety were considered in the study,
although fire was of particular concern. The output
of this study included a list of literature references
on spacecraft crew safety up to 1984 (Peercy eta].
1985b). A subsequent, independent review of the
needs of fire safety in advanced spacecraft led to a
meeting held at the NASA Lewis Research Center in
August 1986, which provided research and technology
recommendations to define studies in spacecraft fire
safety, some of which are currently underway (Fried-
man and Sacksteder, 1987, Youngblood and Seiser,
1988).
The purpose of this paper is to review the
assumptions and knowledge influencing spacecraft fire
safety and its management, drawing on past results and
present studies and designs. An approach to space-
craft fire-risk analysis encompasses three study
themes: (1) the acquisition of fundamental science
knowledge to reduce gaps in required information, (2)
the adaptation of this knowledge into practice for
spacecraft safety, and (3) the formulation of risk
acceptance and mitigation decisions (Rodney, ]987,
Raasch et al. 1985). This paper covers the theme of
fundamental science knowledge by discussing combustion
in the reduced-gravity environment of spaceflight.
The reduction of gravity-induced buoyant flows has a
profound effect on flammability and flame spread;
indeed fires may be inhibited or enhanced in micro-
gravity, depending on particular conditions (Friedman
and Sacksteder, 1987, Friedman, 1987). The paper then
reviews the adaptation of spacecraft and analogous
fire-safety knowledge by describing the techniques for
spacecraft fire detection and fire control. Finally,
the paper covers the theme of risk decisions by expand-
ing the review of techniques to include those poten-
tial problems in future spacecraft that can influence
fire-safety strategies. A concluding section of the
paper surveys specific needs and relevant research
underway for an important future mission, the Space
Station Freedom.
SPACECRAFT FIRE-SAFETY STRATEGIES
The confined quarters, limited atmospheric and
fire-fighting resources, lack of external rescue capa-
bility, and the poorly understood effects of the
microgravity environment make the hazard of fire
extremely dangerous in spacecraft. Risk management
must combat this threat by optimizing risk levels
within the constraints of practicality, technology,
and costs. A spacecraft safety policy must proceed
through steps of identification of hazards, analysis
of their significance, and decisions to alleviate
their impact (Rodney, 1987).
The necessary elements for fire are the presence
of fuel, ignition, and oxygen. These ingredients are
illustrated in Fig. I, which presents the elements in
the form of the familiar fire "triangle" and shows
some examples of hazards encountered in spacecraft and
their controls. Obviously, safety can be guaranteed
by the absolute exclusion of one of the three elements.
In spacecraft, exclusion is approached through elimi-
nation of potential ignition sources by design and
safety procedures and through elimination of potential
fuels by material screening. The NASA Handbook
NHB 8060.IB (Flammability, Odor, etc., 1981) states
that, for unrestricted use in spacecraft, materials
must burn for less than 15 cm (6 in.) upward with a
burning time not to exceed I0 min, when exposed at
the bottom edge to an ignition source in the most haz-
ardous atmosphere anticipated in service. Materials
failing this test may be used only after further
screening in downward burning tests and then used only
in configurations where, by analysis and testing,
flame-propagation paths and ignltion sources are elim-
inated.
In practice, this exclusion of fire-causlng ele-
ments cannot be assured for several reasons. First,
knowledge and experience concerning fire behavlor in
the low-gravity space environment is very limited.
(This, of course, is a major subject of review in this
paper.) Even the rigorous material acceptance stan-
dards of NHB 8060.IB are based on tests necessarily
conducted under ordinary Earth-gravity conditions, and
the fire resistance of approved materials under space
conditions is not generally predictable. Second, a
realistic safety program must recognize the possibil-
ity of "breakdowns," that is, the waivers of non-
approved materials, unexpected ignition sources, and
leakage of oxidant into inerted volumes. Last, some
fire elements may need to be accepted onboard space-
craft in order to allow certain necessary and useful
activities.
Fire-safety strategies for spacecraft are illus-
trated by the relationship of concepts shown In
Fig. 2. The three concepts of control, response, and
recovery each represent an increasing level of risk
acceptance, in the order named. The lowest-risk tac-
tic of control incorporates the design strategies pro-
posed by Peercy and Raasch (1986) as "design to
preclude" and "design to control." This is a first
line of defense, involving the exclusion or at least
the minimization of fire-causing elements. Practical
approaches in this strategy can include spacing and
storage requirements for necessary flammables, safety
factors to reduce ignition-causing energy releases,
and atmospheric inertlng procedures for noninhabited
compartments. The higher-risk tactic of response
recognizes a low probability of the initiation of a
fire. The general NASA fire-prevention principle
applicable in this instance is to assume ignitfon but
require that the resulting fire be self-extinguishing
within a short distance (LeDoux, 1987). Thus the
response strategy involves overheat and fire detection,
alarm systems, automated fire suppression, and fire-
barrier designs, as examples. The highest-risk tactic
of recovery recognizes the lower but finite probabil-
ity of an established fire during long-duration space
missions. The recovery strategy involves crew train-
ing for fire fighting, extinguishment procedures for
entrenched fires, fire-damage control, and atmospheric
cleanup, as examples. A complete program of space-
craft fire safety must encompass all three strategies
illustrated in Fig. 2, providing for recovery proce-
dures even if adequate fire-control and response
procedures are established.
Inherent in the fire-safety strategies, as pro-
posed, is the question of the desirable degree of
safety. The spacecraft safety philosophy of Peercy
and Raasch (1986) offers a baseline option for safety,
where the planned worst-case occurrence would cause
no human injury but may damage an orbiting spacecraft
to the extent that some operations are temporarily
suspended. The application of philosophy to the Free-
dom space station is hardly straightforward; however,
the safety review of Rodney (1987) implies that this
degree of risk acceptance underlies the program p/an-
ning logic. It is interesting to note the other pos-
sibilities for safety directions proposed by Peercy
and Raasch. The most risk-free option is the complete
avoidance of physical damage. The greatest-risk
option is the anticipation of a serious fire, requir-
ing crew evacuation and abandonment of an orbiting
spacecraft.
It is not yet possible to identify all the quan-
titative factors that enter into the philosophy of
risk strategies for orbiting spacecraft such as Free-
dom. Instead, this paper presents information that
may contribute eventually to these risk-management
decisions. The key determinations must account for
the balance between the needs for useful and practi-
cal functions in space and the productivity restric-
tions imposed by safety procedures to lower the risk
of fire.
COMBUSTION AND FIRE IN SPACE
The Space Environment
On Earth it has long been understood that gravi-
tationally induced buoyancy dominates the spread of
fires. The placement of fire detectors in ceiling
locations, for example, anticipates the predictable
upward bulk motion of combustion products in normal
gravity. Now, as a practical matter, the testing of
spacecraft fire-safety technology, including fire
detection and intervention equipment as well as
material-flammability screening, must generally be
performed in ground-based facilities where, in con-
trast to the use environment, buoyant motion domi-
nates. Thus the planning for adequate levels of
safety in spacecraft requires not only an understand-
ing of the low-gravity, fire-related behavior of
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materials and fire-safety oevlces but also the rela-
tionship between normal-gravity behavior and low-
gravity behavior (Sacksteder, 1987).
The Earth-gravitational force acting on a mass
is Proportional to the amount of mass and is exper-
ienced only to the extent that the mass is prevented
from falling (accelerating) freely towards the Earth.
Orbiting vehicles are in a state of near-equilibrium
between centrifugal and gravitational forces, and any
departure from equilibrium or zero gravity results
from the nonuniform imposition of gravity gradients,
residual atmospheric drag, solar wind and other forces.
Thus sma11, unattached objects within the spacecraft
can experience accelerations ranging from about 10-7
to 10-4 times normal Earth gravity levels (I g, or
9.8 m/s2).
Gravitational-induced buoyancy is the result of
gravitational body forces acting on a density gradient
within a fluid medium, caused by temperature (primari-
ly) and molecular-weight differences. Temperature gra-
dients in typical flames can be quite large (1000 K/mm)
and often result in the dominance of buoyant forces in
normal-gravity flames. Nhere the gravitation levels
are slight, I0 -6 g for example, temperature gradients
of this magnitude result in greatly reduced buoyancy
forces, although buoyant motion may not be entirely
negligible. Under these circumstances, other flow-
field components emerge to influence flame spreading
and flammability, namely a Stefan flow associated with
the gasification of the fuel surface and any forced
flow such as cabin ventilation or flow induced by fire-
fighting methods. In a low-gravity spacecraft envi-
ronment, low-level forced flows can inadvertently
sustain the spread of flames.
Unfortunately, the use of spacecraft as a ]abora-
tory or demonstration facility for the study of reduced-
gravity combustion has been limited. In fact, nearly
all available flight data are derived from a series of
tests conducted about 15 years ago by Kimzey (1974) in
the Sky]ab orbiting laboratory. Most reduced-gravity
testing to date has taken advantage of ground-based
facilities that provide a few seconds of near free-
fall conditions (Sacksteder, 1987). These facilities
include drop towers, providing 2 to 5 sec of 10-6 g,
and aircraft flying appropriate maneuvers, providing
about 20 sec of 10-2 g (Rosenthal et al. 1987).
Flammability and Flame Spreadinq in Low Gravity
The flow field in the vicinity of a flame spread-
ing over a solid fuel has a profound influence over
the existence of the flame (flammability) or the rate
at which the flame spreads. Because the driving forces
of the flow field change dramatically from buoyancy-
dominated in normal gravity to a shared influence
between up to three components in low gravity, fire-
protection practices developed for Earth use must be
reconsidered for use in spacecraft.
Few reduced-gravity flame-spread or flammability
data are available. The comparative flame-spreading
tests of Andracchio and Aydelott (1970), confirmed in
a different geometric configuration by Olson (1987),
were performed under quiescent (no forced flow) condi-
tions. These tests showed that, in 02/N 2 atmospheres
with up to 40 percent 02, flame-spread rates are con-
sistently lower in low gravity than in normal gravity.
These authors, as well as Kimzey (1974) in his Skylab
experiments_ also agreed in noting that, for a variety
of fuel types and configurations, the flammabil-
ity limits occur at higher atmospheric oxygen contents
in low gravity than under normal-gravity
conditions. These tests also showed that, in quiescent
environments, low-gravity flames approached spherical
shapes and were less luminous than their normal-gravity
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counterparts (Fig. 3). Provisional conclusions from
these data suggest that low heat and mass transfer
rates result in less efficient, lower temperature, and
reduced flame-speed combustion under space conditions,
which leads to the characterization of the reduced-
gravity environment as intrinsically less flammable or
safer than normal gravity.
A normal-gravity flame environment is never truly
quiescent, since the flame generates an upward buoyant
flow due to the mass-density difference between the
hot combustion gases and the surrounding atmosphere.
It is interesting to note that the addition of low-
velocity ventilating flows to low-gravity flames, at
velocities considerably less than those associated
with the corresponding norma]-gravity buoyancy, greatly
enhances flammability. Preliminary confirmation of
this influence was obtained in drop-tower tests
reported by Foutch (1987) and Foutch, et al. (1987),
who showed increased low-gravity flame spread with
low-velocity superimposed air flows. Support for the
existence of enhanced low-gravity flammability has
appeared in the discussion of O/son (;987) and the
computational modeling of Chen (1986). The recent
experimental efforts of Ferkul (1988) provide a quan-
titative demonstration of increased lower f]ammabiiity
limits for thin samples in an opposed-flow configura-
tion at low gravity. Comparison of flow fields and
temperature fields between normal and low-gravity
flame-spreading environments is essential to estab-
lishing the desired phenomenological linkage.
Near the lower flammability limit, flames spread-
ing in low gravity are often characterized by dim or
nonluminous reaction zones that are often recognized
as flames only through temperature measurements. In
low-gravity tests conducted in drop-tower or airplane
simulators, specimens usually burst into luminous
flaming combustion upon the resumption of gravita-
tional influence at the conclusion of the test time.
Thus it may be essential to provide for incipient fire
detection with attributes of flames other than visible
luminosity and to provide for fire-extinguishant
delivery systems that avoid ]ow-velocity flame
enhancement.
Fire-spread mechanisms not associated with the
surrounding flow field arise uniquely in low gravity.
In the burning of plastic materials, heat transfer to
the surface induces bubble formation within the mol-
ten materials. Bursting of these bubbles releases
jets of vaporized fuel into the surrounding air and
may also result in the ejection of flaming particles.
Trajectories of the flaming particles are not domi-
nated by gravity (i.e., the particles do not fall to
the floor), and this can result in the deposition of
C_._. ..,,.._-_,._,f__ _. q .--__....
ignition sources at remote locations (Olson and
Sotos, 1987).
Thus, present understanding recognizes that low-
gravity combustion and the potential for fire may be
augmented by ventilation, particle expulsion, flame
radiation, and perhaps other factors discussed else-
where (Friedman and Sacksteder, 1987). In addition,
even where flame spread is reduced in low gravity,
the unusual characteristics of incipient and estab-
lished fires in this environment call for pertinent
knowledge and adaptive approaches in the detection
and control of fires in space.
SPACECRAFT APPLICATIONS FOR FIRE DETECTION
Unsafe Conditions and Fire Signatures
The definition of a "fire" is more complex than
generally assumed. Moreover, in spacecraft the pres-
ence of two fire-related conditions must be recognized,
overheating and fire itself. Not only do overheating
materials act as ignition sources for incipient fires,
but overheating also promotes material decomposition
and the off-gassing of toxic or flammable gases.
Fires may initiate and propagate as luminous flames
but also as nonluminous smoldering, a low-temperature
combustion process. Smoldering is prone to occur in
heterogeneous zones of solids and gas, such as in
foams and other permeable materials found in space-
craft. Furthermore, it is possible that smoldering
may be more common in low gravity, due to reduced
fuel-air mixing in the absence of adequate buoyant or
forced flows.
The sensing of an overheating or fire situation
requires the recognition of the departure from normal
conditions. These "signatures" may be in the form of
radiant energy, temperature levels, gaseous species
production, or solid aerosols (smoke). Fire signa-
tures in low gravity may differ from the familiar sig-
natures in normal-gravity fires. Less efficient
flames may generate larger smoke particles and more
carbon monoxide, and cooler flames may be less radi-
ant. Thus the practical sensing of signatures in
spacecraft requires at least some modification of sys-
tems established for ground and aircraft fire sensing.
Fire Detectors
Detectors respond to overheat or fire signatures
through temperature level or rise, radiation, gaseous
products, or aerosols (Bukowski, 1987). One class of
flame detectors responds to the radiant energy emitted
by f]ames in the infrared (IR), visible, or ultraviolet
(UV) wavelength bands. The IR detector responds to
the thermal emissions associated with the fire or heat
source. The detector is slmple and dependable and can
have special circuitry to respond to flame flicker
rather than continuous light from extraneous sources.
The UV detector, however, responds to chemical-specie
emissions (chemiluminescence) in the flame and is less
likely to respond to extraneous radiation in its wave-
length bands. Radiant-energy flame detectors are
line-of-sight devices, but their viewing angles can be
increased by several means. Figure 4 illustrates
these principles with a schematic representation of a
flame radiating directly to a flame-detector monitor
(center), transmitting to a detector through one of
several fiber-optic light tubes (left), and reflecting
into a detector according to the time-dependent posi-
tion of a rotating mirror (right).
Smoke detectors respond to the aerosol particles
generated by overheating, smoldering, and flaming
materials. These detectors are bas'ed on operating
principles of photoelectric light ob.scuration or scat-
tering, ionization-chamber conductance changes, or
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FIGURE 4. - ALIERNATIVEMONITORINGCONFIGURATIONSFOR FLAME
DETECTION IN SPACECRAFT.
less commonly, resistance change of a catalytic bridge
element. An ionization-chamber smoke detector
responds linearly in proportion to the number of par-
ticles and the particle average diameter. This type
of detector retains its sensitivity over a wide range
of particle sizes, and it is particularly effective
for small particles, below about 0.4 pm in equivalent
diameter. The photoelectric Oetector is more sensi-
tive to particle size and has little response to par-
ticles with diameters less than ha]f the wavelength of
the reference beam. For the example of near-infrared
beams, the minimum detectible particle size is about
the order of 0.5 pm. High-sensitivity photoelectric
detectors can, however, respond to the sma]l statisti-
cal distribution of larger particles even in smoke
dispersions of low average-particle diameters. Typi-
ca]ly, smo]dering and incipient fires generate larger
particles, but estab]ished fires tend to generate
sma]ler particles whose average diameter decreases
with time, perhaps as the transport of oxygen improves
(Bukowski and Mu]hoIland, 1978).
Overtemperature and combustion-product detectors
respond to the convective transport of energy and
molecular species. In space, the response of these
detectors is slow un]ess they are fortuitously posi-
tioned at the site of the incipient fire, since the
most dependable mode of signature transport by buoy-
ant free convection is negligible in low gravity.
Nevertheless, these detectors may be valuable supple-
ments in a complete spacecraft fire-protection system,
and the sensors can be designed to respond to rate of
change as well as to the absolute level of their
signature.
Practical Spacecraft Applications
Previous experience. In the first U.S. manned
spacecraft programs, the crew functioned as fire
detectors. Nhile advanced spacecraft are too complex
to relay solely on human observations, without a
doubt, the alertness and discrimination of the crew
will continue as an important complement to automated
fire-detection systems.
The 1973-74 Skylab space station was equipped
with 22 radiation flame detectors, tuned to UV at
wavelengths below 270 nm, whose response was originally
demonstrated in aircraft-based low-gravity tests
(Linford, Ig72a and 1972b). For the Shuttle, several
fire detector concepts were proposed and rejected for
reasons of slow response, uncertain performance in
microgravity, and poor reliability, including a
chemical-species detector (Krupnick, 1971), a smoke
detector using a water-condensation nuclei cloud-
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chamber principle (Bricker, 1985), and a smoke detec-
tor using a quartz-crystal microba]ance bridge princi-
ple (Gibbet al. 1985). The Shuttle now employs nine
ionization smoke detectors in the crew cabin and
equipment bays, as shown in Fig. 5. The present smoke
detector, made by the Brunswick Corp. (Report 0855-251,
May ]985), is used for protection both in the Shuttle
Orbiter and in the Spacelab module carried in the
Shuttle pay]pad bay. The Shuttle detector, sketched in
Fig. 6, has an integral fan to ensure adequate sam-
pling in the absence of buoyant flows (Kubicki, 1981).
False alarms from ambient dust are minimized by an
internal flow bypass to exclude larger particles and
permit entry of small aerosol particles characteristic
of smoke into the ionization chamber.
Proposals for space stations. System-safety cri-
teria have been in place for over a decade to influ-
ence the definitions for space stations (Canetti,
]97]). The formalized candidate guidelines (DG-C&N-]99
in Peercy et a1., 1985b) state that the fire-warning
system is to be activated by smoke, fumes or heat and
is to issue a warning throughout the space station,
locating the fire. DeMeis (1986), quoting consul-
tants, speculated that the most promising detector
concepts for the proposed U.S. Space Station Freedom
are flame detectors (IR) and smoke detectors, with
coaxial-wire thermal detectors in confined areas. The
thermal-detection wires are lines, used currently in
aircraft engine nacelle protection, that sense both
discrete overtemperature and average zone overtempera-
ture (Naldman, 1980). These detectors operate on
principles of thermistor or eutectic-salt-me]ting
changes of resistivity with temperature or gas-law
pressure changes with temperature, and they operate
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reversibly to reset upon resumption of normal condi-
tions after actuation.
For specific fire protection in Freedom, prelimi-
nary criteria established by the NASA Johnson Space
Center call for detection of a minimum 5xlOIOlm 3
smoke particle density and 1.5 percent/m optical
obscuration. Bukowski and Mulho]land (1978) estimate
smoke concentrations to range from IO IO to 1016 parti-
cles/m 3, and the NASA guideline is an approximation
of the very light smoke from an established fire.
From the same source, the obscuration guideline may
be estimated to correspond to a minimum smoke density
of about I0 mg/m 3 for standard lamp-wick smoke.
Tentative fire-detection proposals for Freedom
may incorporate multiple detection, for example,
state-of-the-art smoke detectors, UV flame detectors,
and thermal sensors within the instrument bays and
their ventilation paths. General habitation areas,
including airlocks, may be protected with fan-equipped
smoke detectors using the Shuttle techno]ogy, flame
detectors, and chemical-specie sensors for air quality.
Response and Sensitivity
Assessment of overheat or fire-detector response
(time) and sensitivity (threshold signature) is only
qualitative. In low gravity, it is likely that, due
to slow transport rates of signatures other than elec-
tromagnetic radiation, the response time of many fire
detectors will be slower than in normal gravity.
Location of sensors is an important concern. Nithin
the constraints of mass, power, and cost, it is not
feasible to mount individual sensors throughout a
space station. Techniques such as forced-air assis-
tance, multiple-tube scanning, fiber optics, and
rotating mirrors can maximize coverage with fewer
sensors, although extensive use of coverage enhance-
ment can make the identification of the fire site
difficult.
Sensitivity of detectors also involves trade-offs
in the fact that oversensitive sensors respond fre-
6
quently to other than fire signals (false alarms).
Smoke detectors, for example, are actuated by con-
trolled fires (cooking, smoking), dirt, construction
dust, and fail-safe open circuitry. In spacecraft,
false alarms are particularly undesirable since the
crew must regard all detector alarms as serious indi-
cations for immediate investigation and action.
There are several approaches to augment detector
sensitivity, while minimizing false alarms. Aircraft
experience promotes the use of cross-zoned systems,
where detectors, preferably of differing generic con-
figurations, monitor overlapping zones (Mniszewski
et al. 1983). Logic circuitry requires multiple actu-
ation ("AND" logic) before an alarm is activated.
Another approach is to set sensing elements at two
levels of response, "NARNING" and "DANGER", for example.
In some battle tanks, a two-sensor cross-zone logic
uses manual selectors for normal and combat situa-
tions. The normal condition requires the actuation
of both sensors for activation ("AND" logic); the com-
bat condition responds to a single actuation ("OR"
logic). This technique may be used in spacecraft mod-
ules attended only during working (day) hours, with
"AND" logic in the day, "OR" logic in the night.
Crew Decisions
The preferred reaction to an overheat or fire
alarm should be simple, manual, and rehearsed. On the
other hand, in unattended or inaccessible spacecraft
locations, automated fire protection incorporating
alarms, equipment shut off, and extinguishant dis-
charge is essential. An incipient fire may require
nothing more than localized isolation and cooling, but
a continuing fire would require use of more active
fire-extinguishing procedures. A catastrophic fire
may require partial or complete crew escape, Isolation
of an entire zone, and complex fire-fighting methods.
The safety design guldelines for space stations
(Peercy et al. 1985b) propose common-sense prepara-
tions for the crew, where overall health and safety
responsibilities are assigned to a specific crew mem-
ber, with alternates (the fire marshals).
For long-duration, permanent space operations,
perlodic testing and calibration of detectors should
be scheduled, beyond the conventional continulty
checks of circuitry. Bukowski and Mulholland (1978)
discuss aerosol generators to calibrate smoke detec-
tors, but the low-gravity calibration systems for
radiant, heat, or smoke signatures have yet to be
invented.
FIRE FIGHTING IN SPACECRAFT
Inertinq and "Fire-Safe" Atmospheres
Exclusion of oxygen removes one element of the
"fire triangle" (Fig. I). The exclusion can be con-
tinuous, such as in the maintenance of inert atmo-
spheres in uninhabited compartments, or it can be
temporary, such as in fire extinguishment by inert-gas
flooding. Nitrogen inert_ng for protectlon of fuel
tanks in military aircraft has been studled during
the past decade (Naldman, 1980, Mnlszewski et a1.
1983). A promising technique investigated by
Desmarais and Tolle (1983), Desmarais et al. (1983)
generates the inert gas through oxygen removal from
atmospheric air by methods called onboard inert-gas
generating systems (OBIGGS), using either a molecular-
sieve adsorbent or a permeable membrane. This inert-
ing atmosphere need not be composed entirely of nitrogen.
The OBIGGS separation process is simplified by retain-
ing as much as 6 percent or, for some applications,
even 9-percent residual oxygen in the fire-safe atmos-
phere. The separated oxygen component, vented over-
board in aircraft, would be recycled in spacecraft
counterparts. Other inerting agents have chemical-
extinguishing properties. Halon 1301, an extinguishant
discussed later in this section, effectively prevents
flammability in concentrations typically no greater
than 6 percent.
Inerting need not be confined to uninhabited
spacecraft compartments. For example, Carhart (1987)
has urged the investigation of reduced-oxygen atmo-
spheres for spacecraft habitation zones, based on
favorable submarine test experience. It is well
established that atmospheric compositions with' an
oxygen partial pressure adequate for 1!fe support may
have an oxygen fraction (because of the inert dilu-
ent) insufficient to support combustion (McAlevey and
Magee, 1967). Lowering the oxygen concentration at a
fixed partial pressure of oxygen by nitrogen flooding
is the proposed technique for emergency fire suppres-
sion in submarines. Gannet al. (1978) reported on
the fire-control effectiveness of this method, and
Dressler et al. (1977) reported on the respiratory
safety, based on animal tests. A permanent, fire-safe
atmosphere in a spacecraft more likely would have a
standard (101.3 kPa) total pressure but a reduced oxy-
gen content. The review of Horrigan (1979) noted that
oxygen partial pressures as low as 16.5 kPa, equiva-
lent to those of 1800 m (6000 ft) altitudes, may be
acceptable for long-term human activities. More
unconventional is the recommendation of Huggett (1973)
on the use of a breathable atmosphere in which at
least part of the nitrogen is replaced by a high
molar-heat-capacity diluent gas (sulfur hexafluoride,
for example). Despite the scientific backing for
fire-safe breathing atmospheres, their adoption in
the next generation of spacecraft is doubtful. Human
tests must be performed to assure that the substitute
diluents or the reduced oxygen contents would not have
long-term effects on human efficiency and performance,
at the very least. Some of the proposed options
involve considerable spacecraft structural, gas han-
dling, and metering changes. Most important, many
material, fluid, and biological projects planned for
advanced spacecraft assume the presence of "air," and
adaptations to the unconventional atmospheres may be
impractical.
Fire Extinquishment in Space
Previous experience. In space, an ideal extingui-
shant should be effective (minimum quantity necessary
to extinguish fires), nontoxic in its original state
and by-products, noncorrosive, and readily removable
by the spacecraft cleanup or environmental-control
systems. All types of extinguishants, including
powders, liquids, foams, and gases, may merit some
consideration for space, but no one type of extingui-
shant can meet all of the desirable criteria.
In the early human space missions, the metering
water dispenser was designed as an alternative fire
extinguisher (McAllister, 1972) although Skylab had
extinguishers that discharged foam produced by an
aqueous gel. At present, the Shuttle is equipped
with three fixed and four portable fire extinguishers,
discharging Halon 1301 (trifluorobromomethane), sized
to produce an extinguishant concentration of 6 to
7 percent (Figs. 5 and 7). These extinguishment tech-
niques Owe much to methods evolved for aircraft flight
and ground protection (Desmarais and Tolle, 1983b,
Kuchta and Clodfelter, 1985), where effective systems
use Halon and aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) extin-
guishants, among other agents.
Halon 1301 is a chemical extinguishant, inhibit-
ing the combustion reactions; and it is very effective
on surface fires and, as noted previously, in atmos-
pheric inerting. Tests by Haggard (unpublished NASA
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Lewis data) and Ronney (]985) have shown a correspond-
ing effectiveness in low gravity. In deep-seated
fires, and possibly in smoldering fires, where extin-
guishment proceeds best through cooling and oxygen
exclusion, Halon 1301 is less effective. (In fact,
the National Fire Code, NFPA Standard 12A, paragraph
A-2-4, defines a deep-seated fire as one that cannot
be extinguished by 5 percent Halon 1301 within 10 min
of application.) Ground usage of Halon 130] is an
environmental problem, because the escaped fluorocar-
bon is known to affect the stratospheric ozone layer.
There are also drawbacks to Halon 130] usage in space-
craft (deRis, 1987). Animal tests have demonstrated
that leakage of the unreacted extinguishant is harm-
less for short exposures, but the reacted extingui-
shant generates hydrogen halides, HBr and Hr. The
question of the toxic and corrosive harm from the
Halon 1301 products following a fire and how the pro-
ducts can be removed from the spacecraft atmosphere
remains to be solved. In the Shuttle, Halon ]301 use
is justified by the requirement that a mission is
return to Earth as quickly as possible after extin-
guishant discharge (Kubicki, 1981).
Proposals for space stations. Carbon dioxide is
a leading candidate for the primary extinguishant in
the proposed U.S. Space Station Freedom. Carbon diox-
ide systems are simple, reliable, and cost effective,
and excess extinguishant is removable through the
spacecraft environmental controls. The disadvantage
of carbon dioxide is that, for established fires, con-
centrations of this agent are required that pose toxic
and asphyxiant hazards for humans. Other extingui-
shants have been proposed, other than the state-of-
the-art Halon 1301, whose deficiencies have just been
discussed. DeMeis (1986) calls attention to deionized
water, obviously an effective extinguishant, removable
by the spacecraft environmental controls. The unknown
factor for water is in the proper management of a
spray-delivery system that will work in space. Another
suggestion is AFFF. Foams depend on their ability to
float and blanket the burning surface. In ]o_gEavity,
there is negligible buoyancy, and demonstration tests
will be required to show adherence of the foam to the
burning surface.
Venting. A space-station candidate safety guide-
line (DG-ECS-O08, in Peercy and Raasch, 1985b) pro-
vides for automatic venting of habitable volumes in
the event of a fire or overpressure, to reduce the
total pressure. Continued venting to the vacuum of
space offers an option for ultimate control of diffi-
cult fires by removal of oxygen. This technique of
vacuum venting was investigated on a small scale by
Kimzey (1974) in the Skylab flammability tests. The
interesting observation was that the venting at first
intensified the flame through forced convection before
extinguishing the fire. Thus, large-scale venting
must be carefully planned. Rapid venting can cause
structural damage, but slow venting may temporarily
prolong and increase the burning intensity.
Nevertheless, venting is a plausible last resort
for fires uncontrollable by primary extinguishment
techniques. In Freedom, a decision would be made
quickly to evacuate the fire-fighting crew to a haven
(a designated module or node) and actuate the venting.
After the fire is apparently extinguished, the crew
would appraise the conditions in the affected volume
from the remote location. Rehabilitation and atmos-
pheric reconstitution of the affected zone are aided
by the fact that complete venting is not necessary to
control fires, and the module may retain a substantial
fraction of its original atmosphere at all times.
Automation and special problems. The Shuttle
extinguishing system is entirely manual. Discharge of
the fixed extinguishers is a two-step process, where
the crew first actuate an "armed" switch then the
"discharge" pushbutton. For more complex spacecraft,
some automatic systems must be included. For active,
automatic fire extinguishing systems, selection of a
detector and recognition system with the proper level
of sensitivity and discrimination is critical. The
discharge of extinguishant upon a false alarm in an
unattended compartment could destroy valuable
projects.
Two unusual situations in space may further tax
the fire-extinguishing systems. First, smoldering
may be the most probable fire-related event, and these
nonluminous fires may be as difficult to extinguish
effectively and quickly as they are to detect. Sec-
ond, particle clouds or aerosols, resulting from
spills or other incidents, are persistent and nondis-
persing in space. Fires in these heterogeneous sys-
tems are dangerous in that they are well supplied
with oxygen, propagate quickly, and are difficult to
extinguish.
Atmospheric Contamination and Equipment Damage
In spacecraft, a considerable portion of the
effort in combating fires may take place after the
fire is extinguished. Cleanup, repairs, and medical
attention, as necessary, while patterned after corre-
sponding normal-gravity procedures, may involve unique
activities in space. Of these post-fire activities,
only the subject of atmospheric contamination lies
within the scope of this report.
Toxic combustion-product gases, rather than
burns, are responsible for most human casualties from
fires. Carbon monoxide is the principal lethal agent
in fire products, but plastics may also generate cya-
nides, chlorides, fluorides, and other toxic gases.
The human response to contaminants depends on both
the concentration and the duration of exposure
(Kaplan, IgTg). Acceptable limits derived from
normal-gravity tests may not apply to space. Reduced
convective transport of oxygen affects the tempera-
ture and completeness of combustion, altering the
nature and concentration of combustion products. A
space-station candidate guideline (DG-HMS-I03, in
Peercy and Raasch, 1985b) urges the establishment of
contaminant threshold limit values for space, presuma-
bly including those generated by fires.
Effects of contamination may also be cumulative or
synergistic. For example, a few percent of low-
toxicity CO2 greatly increasesthe lethality of car-
bonmonoxide(Babrauskas,eta]. 1986). In space,
the life-supportatmospheremaybecontaminatednot
onlybyfire by-productsbut alsobythosefromthe
e×tinguishant,for example,the hydrogenhalidesgen-
eratedfromHalon1301. In fact, thechoiceof
advancedspacecraftextinguishingsystemsmaybedic-
tatedasmuchbytheeaseof cleanupas bytheeffi-
ciencyof extinguishment.
In additionto the immediateeffects requiring
post-fire attentions,therearedelayedeffects, pri-
marilycorrosionfromexposureto combustiona d
extinguishantproducts.Someattentionhasbeengiven
to theparticularproblemsfromthehalideproductsof
Halon1301extinguishment.A reviewof Youngblood(1988),citing theAir ForcetestsbyReicheltet al.(1982)andotherunpublishedworks,notedthat expo-
sureto Halon1301fire-extinguishmentproductshadno
immediateadverseffectson theperformanceof elec-
tronic componentsotherwiseprotectedfromtheheatof
a fire. Smokefromburningpolyvinylchloridecable
insulation,however,esultedin severecorrosion.
Sincetheseobservationsarebasedon limited, normal-
gravity tests, there is a strongneedfor further
studyof potential corrosionunderlong-duration,low-gravity conditions.
SPACESTATIONFIRE-SAFETYISSUES
TheSpaceStationFreedomis plannedasa multi-
componentcommunityassembled and maintained in a low
Earth orbit. The purposes of Freedom include tending
independent unmanned orbiters, launching unmanned and
(eventually) manned space probes, and maintaining and
recovering other Earth satellites. Above all, Freedom
space station will be a laboratory and workshop for
scientific and industrial operations that exploit the
advantages of the extraterrestrial location, including
the microgravity environment and the access to near-
perfect vacuum. The scientific and operating crew
will reach and return from Freedom by Shuttle flights,
and the crew will remain for long-duration assign-
ments. Thus, the plans for Freedom and its risk man-
agement must recognize that there will be a range of
housekeeping and recreational activities onboard, as
well as scientific and technological activities.
Responses to fire control must assume that detection,
extinguishment, atmospheric decontamination, and a
moderate portion of repair and medical treatment capa-
bilities are all provided by supplies and systems
within the space station.
The present concept of the Space Station Freedom
laboratory, supply, and habitation zones is that of a
"ladder" arrangement of modules and nodes (Fig. 8).
This configuration assures the evacuation from a dam-
aged or fire-stricken module and its isolation. The
crew may retreat to any portion of the space station
without traversing through the affected volume
(DeMeis, 1986). This safety concept of a "haven" and
the role of the crew in remote management of resources
in an emergency is an essential factor in the present
operational planning for Freedom.
Needs and concerns for space-station fire safety
can be approached by a division Into categories of
those of near-term and of far-term significance. The
near-term issues are those whose resolution is influ-
ential in the designs for Freedom and Its family of
advanced spacecraft. Far-term issues, in contrast,
are those whose resolution may be beyond present capa-
bilities, perhaps requiring testing onboard the opera-
tional Freedom space station itself.
The near-term issues encompass many of the space-
craft fire-safety unknowns and problems already dis-
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FIGURE 8. - ARTIST'S SKETCH OF SPACE STATION, SHOWINGMODULES AND
NODE CONSTRUCTION.
cussed in this paper. A summary of the important
issues, based upon the greatly appreciated reviews and
suggestions of M. Cole of NASA Johnson Space Center
and F. Clarke of Benjamin/Clarke Associates, follows:
(l) Understanding combustion in low gravity,
including energy release and product evolution, for
eventual prediction of fire signatures and combustion-
product composition.
(2) Measurement of ignition and flame spread for
so]id materials in low gravity, for development of
material acceptance standards applicable to the space
environment.
(3) Investigation of aerosol characteristics in
low gravity, to contribute to the understanding of
flammability from spills, line breaks, and other dis-
persions in space.
(4) Development of fire-detection techniques and
systems, suitable for long-term operation in space-
craft, with desirable sensitivity, response, and cali-
bration attributes.
(5) Development of a set of fire-extinguishment
techniques that are effective under all expected
spacecraft operational scenarios.
(6) Application of artificial intelligence and
communication codes to establish response guidelines
for spacecraft fire detection.
(7) Development of environmental controls for
postfire cleanup of combustion and extinguishment pro-
ducts to protect the spacecraft crew and sensitive
equipment.
Certain far-term studies that are valuable in the
utilization and experimental-facility planning for
Freedom are also worth noting. The Freedom space sta-
tion will offer an extremely attractive environment
for low-gravity fire-safety testing, since its labora-
tories promise exposure to microgravity without time
restrictions and generous power, mass, volume, and
diagnostic accommodations. One proposed microgravity-
combustion facility for Freedom that is readily adapt-
able for fire-safety investigations is illustrated in
Fig. 9 (Youngblood and Seiser, 1988, Youngblood,
1988). The facility is a flow loop, designed to fit
into multiple standard-rack locations in a space-
station laboratory module. The primary function of
this facility is the investigation of material flamma-
bility under low-gravity, variable forced-flow condi-
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tions, a realistic representative of the spacecraft
environment. Eventually, such a faciTity could con-
tain installations for standardized material evalua-
tions, detector calibrations, and other testing, both
routine and research. The facility may operate con-
tinuously as a flow loop, except for minor oxygen
makeup and venting as combustion products accumulate.
Freedom would provide certain common utilities and
instrumentation and some degree of crew involvement
to supplement the self-contained and automated fea-
tures shown•
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has presented a review of present
knowledge and applications underlying fire-safety
planning for advanced spacecraft. The purpose of the
review is to establish a risk-management basis for
future spacecraft, particularly a space station which
is a complex, permanent space structure. Minimization
of fire risks may impose excessive demands on struc-
tures and operations, increasing complexity and costs,
and above all, limiting the usefulness of a space sta-
tion. Thus the objective of spacecraft fire-safety
management is a risk optimization based on a trade-
off of practical fire-safety approaches against small
but tolerable risks. The application of this philoso-
phy to orbiting spacecraft involves the interaction of
strategies of control of fire-causing elements,
response to incipient fires, and recovery from fire
damage as necessary. The critical needs to promote
this fire-safety program to meet the needs of space
stations, such as Freedom, can be met through a combi-
nation of fundamental research, practical application,
skillful adaptation of established techniques from
aircraft and submarines, and necessary testing and
demonstrations in low gravity.
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